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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order of the district court 
adjudicating the competing priority of mechanics' liens and a 
trust deed on real property in Utah County. The Utah Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Constitution Article VIII, Section 3 and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in ruling that a 
mechanic's lien for architectural services does not attach until 
commencement of visible, on-site improvements, despite prior 
actual notice of those services? 
2. Whether the district court erred in ruling that the 
mechanic's lien for architectural services did not relate back 
to and take effect as of the commencement of visible on-site 
improvements predating the trust deed? 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Resolution of the issues presented on appeal will be 
determined by construction of the relevant sections of the Utah 
mechanics' lien law, in particular U.C.A. §§38-1-3 and -5, set 
out verbatim in the body of the Brief and in the Addendum. 
(Add. 16.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Sheldon L. Pollack Corp., et al. 
("Pollack") to foreclose a mechanic's lien recorded against real 
property in Utah County to secure payment for architectural 
services rendered concerning the property. Three other such 
actions were filed by other mechanics1 lien claimants with 
regard to the same property. All four actions were consolidated 
for purposes of discovery and trial. (R. 155, 419, 1295.) The 
construction lender moved for partial summary judgment claiming 
that its trust deed had priority over all mechanics' liens on 
the property. (R. 1283.) The lien holders opposed the motion 
and filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the priority 
issue. (R. 1454, 1537, 1549, 1772.) The district court ruled 
in favor of the lender, holding that (1) the lien for 
architectural services did not attach without commencement of 
visible, on-site improvements, despite the lender's prior actual 
notice of those services; (2) a foreclosure judgment in a 
related action barred relation back of the architectural lien to 
visible, on-site improvements preceding the judgment; and (3) 
there were no other on-site improvements predating the lender's 
trust deed to which the architect's lien could relate. (R. 
1934-39, 1990-98; Add. 1-15.) The district court certified its 
order as final under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (R. 1998; Add. 15), and 
Pollack filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 2012). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October 1972, Wilderness Associates, the predecessor 
in interest of Heritage Mountain Development Co. ("Heritage"), 
Appeals filed by two other lien holders are 
consolidated in Case No. 860642. 
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initiated the planning and development of a ski resort to be 
located on three contiguous parcels of real property in Utah 
County (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the 
Property"): 110 acres owned in fee simple ("Fee Property"); 41 
acres leased from the State of Utah ("Leased Property"); and 
4500 acres of federal land under Special Use Permit from the 
United States Forest Service ("Permit Property"). The master 
plan for the resort called for the use and common development of 
all three parcels. (Williamson Dep. 29-39.) 
Between September 1978 and the summer of 1982 Heritage 
was engaged in construction of the ski resort. Heritage 
developed its resort headquarters on the Leased Property, which 
improvements included an office building, sewer and water lines, 
parking lots, sidewalks, etc. (R. 1147-49.) During this same 
period of time, construction access roads were cut, ski trails 
were flagged and excavated, and soil tests were performed on the 
Property. (Williamson Dep. 43, 88, 106-08; Compton Dep. 
17-24.) From early 1981 to the summer of 1982, Pollack and 
others rendered architectural, engineering, surveying, 
consulting, or planning services regarding the overall resort 
project. (R. 2028-Exhibits, Pollack Claim Tab 1; R. 773, 1149, 
1260; Williamson Dep. 137-40.) 
On November 17, 1982 a mortgage lender obtained a 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure on the Fee Property in the 
separate case of First Security Bank v. Wilderness Associates, 
Civil No. 54367, Fourth District Ct. of Utah County. (R. 1149, 
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1157.) The Fee Property was subsequently sold at auction to a 
third-party. (R. 1149, 1179.) However, following a series of 
loan transactions with different lenders, Heritage reacquired 
the Fee Property on June 29, 1983. (R. 1150-51.) Between April 
and July 1983, Aztec Engineering, Inc. surveyed and staked the 
boundaries of the Property under contract with Heritage. (R. 
1592-96, 1151, 773.) Between June and September of 1983, 
Pollack and others resumed work and rendered extensive 
architectural, engineering, consulting, or planning services for 
the Heritage development. The value of this work runs into the 
millions of dollars. (R. 570-81, 793-800, 1152, 773-74, 
2028-Exhibits.) 
On September 15, 1983 Heritage obtained a predevelopment 
loan of $16,900,000 from Guaranty Savings and Loan Association 
("Guaranty"), an Arkansas lender. To secure the loan, Heritage 
executed a trust deed on the Property, which was recorded that 
same day. The purpose of this loan was to pay off prior trust 
deed notes and to finance advancement of the project to where 
Heritage could qualify for a subsequent long-term development 
loan of $160 million from a different lender. (R. 1151-52; 
Williamson Dep. 73-75, 93-94.) 
At the time of extending the loan, Guaranty had actual 
knowledge of Pollack's architectural work performed regarding 
the Property prior to the date Guaranty's September 1983 trust 
deed was recorded. In fact, most of the architectural work 
performed by Pollack during the summer of 1983 was done to 
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assist Heritage in providing information for the loan package to 
qualify for the long-term financing. Both Guaranty and the 
long-term lender had direct contact with Pollack and knew 
first-hand of Pollack's architectural work prior to the 
recording of Guaranty's trust deed. (R. 1747, 1754-58; 
Williamson Dep. 72-75, 147-50, 168-69.) 
The long-term financing fell through; no additional 
on-site construction took place, with the exception of 
remodeling the headquarters office building; and the project 
ground to a halt by the summer of 1984, leaving the contractors 
unpaid. (Williamson Dep. 94-96, 112; R. 1152.) After Heritage 
failed to pay for the services and improvements performed 
concerning the Property, Pollack and other lien holders sued to 
foreclose their mechanics1 liens. Guaranty opposed the suits, 
asserting that its trust deed of September 15, 1983 had priority 
over all mechanics1 liens on the Property. (R. 253, 346.) 
The parties filed extensive memoranda supporting and opposing 
cross-motions for summary judgment on the priority issue. (R. 
1249, 1454, 1549, 1630, 1772.) 
The district court held that "commencement of work," for 
the purpose of establishing lien priority under section 38-1-5, 
requires "visible, on-site" improvements, and that liens for 
architectural and engineering work, therefore, do not attach 
until commencement of on-site construction. (Add. 4-5, 14.) 
The court concluded that while Pollack and the other architects 
and engineers had "valid liens applying to all of the property 
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of the project," those liens did not attach because no 
post-foreclosure on-site work was done; accordingly, Guaranty's 
September 1983 trust deed has priority even though Guaranty had 
actual knowledge of the prior lienable services. (Add. 5, 
14-15.) In addition, the court held that the November 1982 
foreclosure judgment on the Fee Property barred relation back of 
the architectural liens to work performed on the rest of the 
Property prior to that date, and that there was no other on-site 
work between the foreclosure and the trust deed to which the 
architectural liens could relate back. (Add. 5.) This appeal 
followed. (R. 2012.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah mechanics1 lien law is intended and construed to 
ensure payment of those who contribute labor and materials to 
the improvement of real property. Architects are, by statute, 
given a lien for their services and are thus included in the 
class of persons protected by the law. The architect's lien is 
valid and enforceable even though construction is never 
commenced. Pollack's lien attached at the time of commencement 
to do the architectural work and has priority over Guaranty's 
subsequently recorded trust deed. Guaranty's actual notice of 
Pollack's prior work satisfies any supposed constructive notice 
requirement contemplated by the lien priority statute. 
Alternatively, Pollack's lien for architectural services 
relates back to the commencement of visible, on-site 
improvements predating the 1982 foreclosure judgment, or 
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occurring between the time of the foreclosure and the recording 
of Guaranty's September 1983 trust deed. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: POLLACK'S MECHANIC'S LIEN FOR ARCHITECTURAL WORK 
ATTACHED ON THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF SUCH WORK 
AND HAS PRIORITY OVER THE SUBSEQUENTLY RECORDED 
TRUST DEED. 
The Utah mechanics' lien law is remedial in nature. Its 
aim and purpose is to protect, "at all hazards, those who 
perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the 
construction of a building or other improvement," and thereby 
enhance the value of the property. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. 
Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 244 (1917); Calder Bros. Co. 
v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). The statute is 
intended to prevent the owner of land from receiving the 
benefits of services and improvements without paying for them. 
Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 447 (1967). 
The lien statutes are construed broadly to effectuate their 
protective purpose. AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and 
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986); Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982.) 
A. Lien For Architectural Services 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 expressly provides a lien for 
architectural services: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons 
performing any services . . . used in the . . . 
improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished 
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who 
have rendered other like professional service, or 
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bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon 
or concerning which they have rendered service . . . for 
the value of the service rendered . . . . 
[Emp. added; Add. 16.] 
Thus, the Legislature has determined that architectural services 
benefit the property concerning which they are rendered, and 
that persons rendering those services are therefore entitled to 
the protection of the mechanics1 lien statute. 
Construing section 38-1-3 in Zions First National Bank v. 
Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970), this Court held 
that architects have a valid lien for their services even though 
their work is not performed directly upon the property, and 
"although [their] plans may not be brought to fruition by 
erection of a building." 464 P.2d at 388. That holding is 
unquestionably correct because a mechanic's lien attaches to the 
land as well as to the buildings that may or may not be 
ultimately placed on the land. U.C.A. §38-1-4, Add. 16; Eccles 
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, 715-16 (1906). 
See also Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446 (1967) 
(lien for improvement conferred by landscape architect); 
Headlund v. Daniels, 50 Utah 381, 167 P. 1170 (1917). 
It is undisputed that Pollack has a perfected lien for 
its architectural services. Pollack rendered its services 
pursuant to a contract with Heritage, timely recorded its notice 
of lien, and otherwise complied with the statutes to perfect its 
lien. (R. 1794.) As the district court found, "the architects 
and engineers do have valid lien rights for the work they have 
-8-
done." (Add. 5.) Thus, the only real issue is the priority of 
that lien relative to Guaranty's trust deed. 
B. Priority of Lien for Architectural Services 
1. Utah Law 
The attachment and priority of mechanics' liens, 
including architects' liens, are governed by U.C.A. §38-1-5: 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, 
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do 
work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure 
or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, 
mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached 
subsequently to the time when the building, improvement 
or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or 
other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice 
and which was unrecorded at the time the building, 
structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or 
first material furnished on the ground. 
[Emp. added; Add. 16.] 
Section 38-1-10 places all mechanics' liens on equal footing for 
purposes of priority: 
The liens for work and labor done or material 
furnished as provided in this chapter shall be upon an 
equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice 
and claim of lien and regardless of the time of 
performing such work and labor or furnishing such 
material. [Emp. added; Add. 16.] 
Accordingly, a mortgage or trust deed recorded after attachment 
of a mechanic's lien is inferior in priority to that lien and 
all other mechanics' liens filed concerning the property. First 
of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel and Associates, 600 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). 
The district court construed section 38-1-5 to mean that 
no mechanics' liens attach until the commencement of visible, 
on-site improvements, without regard to actual notice of 
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off-site lienable work. However, the effect of that 
interpretation is that an architect's lien would never attach 
where construction, for whatever reason, never begins, thus 
rendering the architects' lien worthless. That result is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute and this Court's 
holding in Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 
464 P.2d 387 (1970). 
In construing the language of section 38-1-5, it must be 
remembered that to accomplish the protective purpose of the 
mechanics' lien law, "the phrase 'commencement to do work,' as 
used in [that] statute is construed in favor of lien 
claimants." Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P..2d 922, 924 
(Utah 1982). Section 38-1-5 designates two principal points in 
time at which mechanics' liens may attach, depending on the type 
of work involved: either at "the time of the commencement to do 
work or [at the time of] furnish[ing] materials on the ground." 
The district court erroneously combined this language into one 
standard that postpones attachment of all liens until 
"commencement of work on the ground." However, the phrase "on 
the ground," which appears three places in section 38-1-5, 
modifies only "furnish materials" or "material furnished"; it 
Section 38-1-5 subsequently adds a third possible lien 
attachment point when it states that the mechanics' liens have 
priority over any "other encumbrance which may have attached 
subsequently to the time when [1] the building, improvement or 
structure was commenced, [2] work begun, or [3] first material 
furnished on the ground." 
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does not modify or limit the phrase "commencement to do work." 
In all three places in section 38-1-5, the phrase "commencement 
to do work" or "work begun" is separated from the phrase 
"furnish materials on the ground" or "material furnished on the 
ground" by the alternative conjunction "or." Thus, the statute 
plainly contemplates alternative times of lien attachment, and 
the time of attachment of architects' liens is naturally "the 
time of commencement to do [that] work." 
This construction of section 38-1-5 is supported by the 
holding in Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 
464 P.2d 387 (1970). There, this Court acknowledged the fact of 
alternative lien attachment points in holding that an 
architect's lien attached even though no work was "commenced on 
the ground." Relying on Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 
Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959), the Zions Court properly 
distinguished between a lien for architectural work, "which is 
not done directly upon the property," and a lien for work by 
contractors or laborers that "is done upon the property." 464 
P.2d at 388-89. Because of the different types of lienable 
work, the priority statute must recognize different points or 
methods of lien attachment. As the Court concluded in Zions, 
where there is a priority problem with an architect's lien, the 
proper recourse is "to resolve the priorities and not to 
reconstruct the specific language of [the lien statutes] so as 
to deprive an architect, who has rendered services concerning a 
specific res, of his lien." Ld. at 389. 
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Thus, while no Utah case has expressly decided when an 
architect's lien attaches, the plain language of section 38-1-5 
and the holding in Zions demonstrate that it attaches at the 
time of commencement of the architectural work. To conclude 
otherwise would, in cases where construction is not commenced, 
produce the anomaly of an unattached architect's lien. If an 
architect of an unconstructed building has a lien, as Zions 
holds, that lien must have attached or it is illusory and no 
lien at all. And the only point in the statute at which it 
could attach is the "commencement to do work." Since the 
district court acknowledged the undisputed fact that 
architectural work was commenced prior to the recording of 
Guaranty's trust deed (Add. 5), Pollack's architect's lien 
attached and has priority over the trust deed. 
2. Colorado Law 
While the issue of when an architect's lien attaches has 
not been squarely decided in Utah, the issue has been decided in 
our neighboring state of Colorado under a statute similar to 
Utah's. Utah's mechanics' lien law originates from and is 
patterned after the mechanics' lien statutes of Colorado. That 
fact is noted by the compilers of the 1943 Utah Code Annotated: 
Origin and history of act. The Mechanic's Lien Law of 
this state was taken from Colorado, together with the 
construction placed thereon by the Colorado courts. 
[Compilers Note to Title 52, Chapter 1, 1943 Utah Code, 
Add. 17; see also notes to §§52-1-3 to -5, 1943 Utah 
Code, Add. 19-21.] 
It is a well-settled rule of law that when the Legislature 
adopts a statute from another state, that state's judicial 
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construction of the statute is also presumed to be adopted and 
is persuasive authority in the courts of the adopting state. 
E.g., Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 
904 (Utah 1984); State v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d 
1019, 1020 (1961) (Colorado decisions construing adopted 
statute, before and after adoption, are persuasive). 
Accordingly, absent controlling Utah law, this Court should be 
guided by decisions of the Colorado courts concerning attachment 
and priority of architects1 liens. 
Under Colorado law, an architect's lien attaches at the 
commencement of the architectural work and has priority over a 
subsequently recorded trust deed. For example, in Bankers Trust 
Co. v. El Paso Pre-Cast Co., 192 Colo. 468, 560 P.2d 457 (1977), 
architectural and engineering work for an apartment project was 
performed for several months before the lender agreed to the 
construction loan and recorded its trust deed on the property. 
In fact, as in the present case, the architect's plans and 
drawings were submitted to the lender to obtain the project 
financing. In the subsequent priority dispute, the lender 
argued that the liens for architectural and engineering work did 
not attach until the commencement of on-site construction, which 
was after recording of the trust deed. The Colorado Supreme 
Court rejected that argument, holding that architectural and 
engineering services constitute "commencement of work" under the 
lien priority statute and that the liens for those services 
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therefore had priority over the lender's subsequent trust deed. 
The court reasoned: 
The district court assumed without deciding, and 
Bankers agreed, that "work" in the context of [the 
Colorado lien priority statute] means lienable work. 
Assuming the correctness of this definition, it is clear 
by decisions of this court that an architect's and 
engineer's preliminary work is lienable. Consequently, 
[the architects and engineers] performed "work" before 
November 20, 1972, the record date of Bankers' trust deed. 
We have construed "commencement of the work" broadly, 
in accord with the principle that mechanics' lien laws 
should be construed in favor of lien claimants. Thus, 
[we have] held that an architect's lien related back to 
the commencement of his work upon the plans and drawings. 
. . , In accord with these cases and the policy of 
mechanics lien law, we hold that [the architect's and 
engineers'] services here constitute "commencement of the 
work upon the structure or improvement" under [the 
priority statute]. 
As a result, the district court correctly ruled that 
the interests of all lienholders were superior to 
Bankers' interest under its deed of trust. 
3 
Id. at 460-61, citations omitted. 
The earlier Colorado case of Park Lane Properties v. 
Fisher, 89 Colo. 591, 5 P.2d 577, 579 (1931), also held that an 
architect's lien relates back to the commencement of work upon 
the plans and drawings and has priority over a subsequently 
recorded trust deed. See also Weather Engineering and 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Pinon Springs Condominiums, Inc., 192 
Colo. 495, 563 P.2d 346, 349 (1977) (preliminary work of 
architect, engineer or surveyor constitutes "commencement of 
Bankers Trust was cited with approval by this Court in 
Calder Bros., supra, 652 P.2d at 924, for the rule that 
"commencement to do work" should be construed in favor of 
mechanics' lien claimants. 
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work" under lien priority statute); Seracuse Lawler & Partners, 
Inc. v. Copper Mountain, 654 P.2d 1328 (Colo. App. 
1982) (architect entitled to lien from commencement of 
preliminary work despite noncompletion of project). 
The same policy and rationale for giving architects lien 
priority as of commencement of their work under Colorado law 
apply equally to section 38-1-5; therefore, the result should be 
the same under Utah law. In sum, Pollack's lien for 
architectural services relates back to 1981 when that work 
commenced, or at least to the summer of 1983 when Pollack's work 
resumed, and thus has priority over Guaranty's September 1983 
trust deed. 
3. Error of District Court's Notice Rationale 
The district court's rationale for requiring visible "on 
the ground" improvements for lien attachment was to afford 
potential mortgage lenders constructive notice of possible prior 
liens. (Add. 4-5.) However, while one of the underlying 
policies of section 38-1-5 is to give notice of potential 
mechanics' liens to interested parties, Calder Bros., supra, at 
924 n.l, neither the language of 38-1-5 nor any case construing 
that statute requires such notice as a prerequisite for 
mechanics' lien attachment. As noted above, 38-1-5 provides 
that liens may attach either at the commencement of work or the 
furnishing of materials on the ground. Since 38-1-3 authorizes 
liens for certain types of work not performed "on the ground," 
the only proper joint construction of the statutes is that 
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certain liens may attach without visible notice to third-parties 
who investigate no further than a visual inspection of the 
ground. Had the Legislature intended to require notice as a 
prerequisite to lien attachment, it would have stated that liens 
attach at the time notice of commencement to do work is given. 
But 38-1-5 does not say that; it says that liens attach at the 
time of commencement of work, without regard to notice. 
In any event, lack of notice may not be invoked to defeat 
the architect's lien in this case because Guaranty had actual 
knowledge of the architectural work performed by Pollack prior 
to the recording of its trust deed. (Williamson Dep. 147-50, 
168-69.) In order to obviate further discovery on the issue of 
actual notice, Guaranty conceded that it had prior knowledge of 
the architectural work: 
Guaranty still agrees not to controvert the assertions of 
Pollack concerning the commencement of its architectural 
work and, as such, the evidence which Pollack states it 
needs to obtain through discovery concerning the 
commencement of its work and the knowledge of Guaranty 
concerning the same is stipulated to . . . . 
. . . Guaranty has agreed not to controvert the 
assertions that it knew, or should have known, that 
Pollack was performing architectural work between June 
30, 1983 and September 30, 1983. [R. 1603-04.] 
Guaranty subsequently reaffirmed this "unequivocal 
representation" of actual notice of the prior architectural 
work. (R. 1747.) 
In fact, Guaranty has acknowledged that, as a practical 
matter, loans cannot be made without a formal proposal that 
includes the architectural drawings and planned scope of the 
project. (R. 1267.) Guaranty received such a proposal in this 
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case before agreeing to the loan. (Williamson Dep. 168-69.) 
All Guaranty had to do to ensure first lien priority was to see 
that the architectural and other prior work was paid for as part 
of the loan transaction. Instead, Guaranty chose to ignore the 
prior liens, accept the improvements, and then attempt to beat 
the mechanics out of their money. Thus, on these facts, the 
district court clearly erred by construing 38-1-5 to require 
constructive notice over actual notice. Guaranty's actual 
notice of the prior architectural work satisfies any supposed 
notice requirement of 38-1-5 and renders its trust deed inferior 
in priority to the architect's lien. As noted in Tripp v. 
Vaughn, 72 U.A.R. 54 (Utah App. 1987), which upheld the priority 
of the lender's trust deed only for lack of notice of the prior 
work: 
[I]n order for a lien to relate back, notice that the 
earlier work has commenced must be given to others who 
may claim a lien, such as a lender. 
[Id. at 56.] 
Here the lender had such notice; therefore, Pollack's lien 
prevails over the trust deed. 
Point II; ALTERNATIVELY, POLLACK'S LIEN FOR ARCHITECTURAL 
SERVICES RELATES BACK TO AND TAKES EFFECT AS OF THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF VISIBLE ON-SITE IMPROVEMENTS 
PREDATING THE TRUST DEED. 
A. Pre-Foreclosure Work 
As noted and documented in the Statement of Facts, 
Heritage began construction on the ski resort project in 
September 1978. Between that date and the summer of 1982 
Heritage cut access roads and ski trails through the Property 
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and constructed its project headquarters on the Leased 
Property. The headquarters office building was designed and 
constructed to fit in with the overall theme of the ski resort 
and was part of the master plan for the development. (Olsen 
Dep. 7; Williamson Dep. 33.) The district court ruled that the 
foreclosure judgment of November 17, 1982 on the Fee Property 
precluded relation back of mechanics1 liens to any on-site work 
performed on any part of the project property to that date. 
(Add. 5.) However, the district court overstated and 
misconstrued the effect of the foreclosure judgment. 
To begin with, the foreclosure judgment applied only to 
the Fee Property, not to the rest of the Property on which the 
project headquarters, roads and trails had been constructed. 
(R. 1149.) Moreover, that judgment extinguished only those 
mechanics' liens and other claims on the Fee Property that were 
in existence at the time of the November 1982 entry of the 
judgment. (See Judgment 1F13, R. 1172, quoted and relied upon by 
the district court.) Thus, the foreclosure judgment does not 
prevent Pollack's architect's lien from relating back to 
commencement of on-site improvements on the Leased Property or 
Permit Property predating the November 1982 judgment. 
That point is supported by First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors v. C.N. Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 
1979). There, a contractor commenced construction on a 
subdivision by installing water, sewer, and storm drain systems 
before the recording of the construction lender's trust deed. 
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Subsequently, that initial contractor was paid and executed a 
release of all lien claims. In the ensuing priority dispute, 
the lender argued that the release rendered its trust deed 
superior to all mechanics' liens. This Court held that the 
release applied only "to those rights [of the initial 
contractor] accrued up to the time of the release." Id. at 
527. Moreover, the Court held that the release did not prevent 
liens of other claimants from relating back to the date of 
commencement by the initial contractor: 
As to the lien claimants left in the case, all their 
work on the project was completed prior to the date of 
Child Bros.1 [the initial contractor's] release. Their 
lien rights had already attached. These lienholders were 
not parties to the release, did not consent to its terms, 
and are not in the category of subcontractors or 
materialmen performing labor or furnishing materials at 
the instance of Child Bros., and therefore the release 
does not affect their status as lienholders. They are 
entitled to the same priority date as that originally 
accorded Child Bros. . . . . [Jd.] 
See also Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 1985) (upheld 
relation back of mechanics' liens to date of commencement by 
contractor who had released claim). 
Thus, even assuming that all liens on the Fee Property 
for work performed prior to November 1982 were extinguished by 
the foreclosure judgment, that does not prevent relation back of 
Pollack's lien to those extinguished liens or to pre-foreclosure 
work on other parcels. 
B. Post-Foreclosure Work 
Pollack's lien may also relate back to visible on-site 
improvements made after the November 1982 foreclosure judgment 
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but prior to the September 1983 trust deed. Those improvements 
consisted of surveying and staking the boundaries of the 
property and of taking soil core samples for engineering 
studies. (R. 1149, 1151-52, 1260-61.) The district court 
erroneously ruled that these improvements do not constitute 
"visible, on site commencement of work." (Add. 4-5.) 
Surveying and engineering work is lienable work under 
U.C.A. §38-1-3. Moreover, that work in this case was performed 
"on the ground" and was visible. Such work constitutes an 
improvement to the Property and gives rise to a lien with 
priority over a subsequently recorded trust deed. E.g., Weather 
Engineering and Manufacturing, Inc. v. Pinon Springs 
Condominiums, Inc., 563 P.2d 346, 348-49 (Colo. 1977); Midland 
Mortgage Co. v. Sanders England Investments, 682 P.2d 748, 
749-50 (Okla. 1984). 
In sum, Pollack's architect's lien may relate back to 
visible, on-site improvements performed either before the 
foreclosure judgment, or between the foreclosure judgment and 
the recording of Guaranty's trust deed. Thus, the district 
court erred in holding Guaranty's trust deed superior to 
Pollack's architect's lien. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the 
district court's order of partial summary judgment on the 
priority issue, enter judgment holding Pollack's architect's 
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lien superior to Guaranty's trust deed, and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• • * * • • • 
KETCHUM, KONKEL, BARRETT, NICKEL ) 
& AUSTIN, dba KKBNA INCORPORATED 
a Utah corp., ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
KENT W. WALKER and MICHAEL V. 
LEE, a Utah partnership, dba THE 
ARCHITECTURAL PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants. 
SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION 
a California corporation, et al. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, et al. 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * 
RECEIVED 
OCT -6 1986 
Case Number 69,472 
RULING 
The plaintiffs initiated this action against Heritage 
Mountain and defendant Guaranty Savings & Loan Association who 
i 
received a $16.9 million dollar loan from Guaranty which was 
secured by deeds of trust recorded June 29, 1983 and September 
15, 1983. The lienholders consist of architects and engineers, 
which include three plaintiffs, Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel 
and Austin, dba KKBNA Incorporated; Walker and Lee, dba The 
Architectural Partnership; and Shelden Pollack Corporation. The 
defendants Langenheim Associates, Delta Geotechnical Consultants 
and Forsgren-Perkins Engineering, P.A. all performed consulting, 
engineering or architectural services., The other class of lien 
claimants are entities associated with Heritage Mountain 
Development, Inc., lending institutions (not claiming priority 
over Guaranty) or contractors who performed labor or supplied 
materials subsequent to recording Guaranty's trust deed in 
September of 1983. 
The property which has been liened consist of three 
distinct parcels, (1) 40 acres of property leased from the State 
of Utah where a barn has been remodeled into an office building; 
(2) 110 acre of undeveloped fee property; and (3) 4500 acres of 
undeveloped U.S. Forest Service permits. 
The above mechanic lien claimants are claiming priority 
over the trust deeds of Guaranty Savings & Loan Association. 
It is to be noted that prior to this action there have 
been two other phases to this litigation involving Heritage 
Mountain's and various lien claims. They are as follows: 
1. First Security Bank of Utah v. Wilderness 
Associates, Civil No. 54367. This proceeding culminated in a 
sheriff's sale on December 23, 1982, based upon a judgment 
entered by the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court wherein it was decreed that: 
"..•each person whose conveyance or encumberance 
is unrecorded or was recorded subsequent to the 
plaintiffs1 filing of the lis pendens be, and 
hereby is, declared to be forever barred or 
foreclosed of all right, claim, lien and equity or 
other right of redemption in and to the total 
property or any portion thereof." 
The sheriff's sale held on December 23, 1982 resulted in 
Paramount Life Insurance Company as the successful bidder and 
there was no redemption and a sheriff's deed was later issued to 
Paramount Life Insurance Company. 
2. The second phase was a suit filed by Dwayne J. Sykes 
v Wilderness Associates, Civil No. 62546, wherein Sykes attempted 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien recorded with the county recorder 
after the commencement of the First Security foreclosure action. 
Sykes had not been named as a party in the first phase of the 
litigation, but this court ruled that Sykes claims were 
extinguished pursuant to the judgment and decree of foreclosure 
in the first phase. 
3. The present proceeding is the third phase pursuant 
to which the motions for summary judgment are now before the 
court and the litigation involves Wilderness Associates and its 
successor, Heritage Mountain Development Company, wherein the 
architects, engineers and surveyors, contractors and other 
lending institutions all seek priority over Guaranty Savings & 
Loan Association's trust deed. 
The Court has considered all the memorandum filed by 
parties to this lawsuit having an interest in the matter of 
priorities, and has heard oral argument from all parties desiring 
to present the same to the court, and after reviewing this matter 
further the court has concluded as enters the following: 
RULING 
The motion of defendant Guaranty Savings & Loan 
Association for partial summary judgment establishing the order 
of priorities in this lawsuit is granted. 
The court has concluded that, although a question of 
^KOtBt impression in the State of Utah, the majority of 
jurisdictions in the United States, through what the court 
concludes to be the best reasoned decisions hold that 
"i^ lBiraericeme^  of establishing priority 
<j^£eeof8ed"e^ Oft-site commencement of 
SMBrte'tnFsrt wch«r*ie*sr lieim* m&cMeoturml 
* l * i ^ ^ $ k ^ ^ ^ wh<t»>:^ pi^oveTftentg are to be* 
\m&fepr?m& *MOWif sTiJrfrfg 'for €H« 1piirp6a& Of Establishing. 
ti®m&m?±&&^^matr f ffltn*ilLh'Sr*-t*^^^ commencement 
^ > i * » W ^ ^ adhere to . This 
interpretation is consistant with the language of Section 38-1-5^ 
U.C.A. which provides that: 
" . . . liens . . . take effect as of the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish materials 
WT the ground . . . and shall have priority over 
. other encumbrances which . . . attached 
subsequently to the time when . . . the structure 
was commenced, work begun or first material 
furnished on the ground, . . . " 
The reasons generally announced for the on-site 
requirement involve the commercial necessity of the financier of 
the project, before money would be advanced for such 
improvements, to be accorded priority upon recording his 
financing documents if there is no on-site indication that other 
mechanic's have expended labor or furnished material prior to 
such recording. 
Without this protection, lending institutions would be 
reluctant to lend money for the development of projects such as 
the one in question. 
It appears that certain mechanic's liens filed by those 
improving the barn on the 40 acre leased tract were performed 
after the filing of the last of Guaranty's trust deeds, and would 
therefore not predate the filings of Guaranty nor preempt its 
first position. 
The qiarims of the architects although there work was 
timmLw£tB&~tbm ~secondr pftsse ~o£ lirbiga:tion: but prior to the f iling 
oir*€t«pr»n^ since their 
i p ^ J t n ^ ^ other consultants* 
(tfe*Hiot^6nstitu€e ^Visible dn-site improvements". 
All other claims for work done prior to the recordation 
of Guaranty's trust deeds are barred by virtue of the decision in 
the first phase of the litigation in this matter (Civil no. 
54367) and the subsequent ruling in phase 2 (Civil no. 62546). 
The court notes that the msaMfcrnotom* 9n& engineers do* 
WNhingsilidTien rights^ for the work they have done subject to the 
priority determination as hereinabove made, «m* "that those lienaj 
»P¥3»iriiiti^ l^  aFFeet:^ tK4f^ IS^ errati^  prr<3^ eclr and to the extent that they 
come subsequent to the phase 1 ruling w^i^-be--'valid liens4 
afq^TxngtxriTI'br tft£ property of tire pWj£tf£. 
The crosss motions for summary judgment by Nordic, 
Walker and Lee and all other parties hereto seeking to establish 
their priority over the trust deeds of Guaranty are denied. 
Counsel for the defendant Guaranty Savings & Loan 
Association is directed to prepare and appropriate order of 
partial summary judgment based upon the above and foregoing 
rulin9
- ^J? &*J2U*~ 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this ^. day of—SJsptswfewT, 
1986, ^ 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
BaKOV 18 PKfc33 
LeROY S. AXLAND, Esq. 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. 
CARL F. HUEFNER, Esq. 
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Guaranty Savings & Loan Association 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KETCHUM, KONKEL, BARRETT, 
NICKEL and AUSTIN, d/b/a 
KKBNA INCORPORATED, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
and GUARANTY SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Arkansas 
savings and loan association, 
Defendants. 
KENT W. WALKER and MICHAEL V. 
LEE, d/b/a THE ARCHITECTURAL 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
GUARANTY SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND JUDGEMENT 
REGARDING PRIORITY 
INTERESTS AMONG PARTIES 
Consolidated 
Civil No. 69472 
Judge George E. Ballif 
EXHIBIT C 
SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION 
a California corporation, et al. 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT ) 
COMPANY, et al. ) 
Defendants. ) 
On June 4, 1986, defendant, Guaranty Savings and Loan 
Association, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
issue of the priority of claims on the relevant real property 
which is the subject matter of this litigation. On June 30, 
1986, defendant Nordic Constructors, Inc. filed a cross motion 
for Summary Judgment on the same issue as did plaintiff Sheldon 
L. Pollock Corporation and Norbert W. Pieper, AIA, Inc. on August 
27, 1986. Various memoranda were filed by the parties in support 
of and in opposition to the various motions filed herein and 
the court heard oral argument from all parties desiring to present 
the same to the court on Tuesday, September 9, 1986 at 2:30 p.m. 
After consideration of the memoranda, argument of counsel, affi-
davits and untraversed deposition testimony, and being fully 
advised in the premises: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-
ation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be, and the same 
hereby is granted. 
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2. That defendant Nordic Constructors, Inc.'s Motion 
for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is denied. 
3. That plaintiff Sheldon L. Pollack Corporation 
and Norbert W. Pieper, AIA, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
be, and the same hereby is denied. 
4. That defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-
ation's Deed of Trust dated June 17, 1983 and recorded in the 
office of the County Recorder of Utah County, Utah on September 
15, 1983, as Entry No. 28168 in Book 2078, pages 40-59 securing 
payment in the amount of $16.9 million dollars (herein "Deed of 
Trust11) is a valid subsisting first lien upon the property des-
cribed therein (hereinafter "Property"), said Property being 
situate in Utah County, Utah, more particularly described as: 
Parcel #1 
Beginning at a Point which is South 2233.73 feet and East 
1353.38 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
193.37 feet; thence West 121.53 feet; thence N 22#23'00" W 123.00 
feet; thence N 20#36'47" E 501.28 feet; thence S 89°59'28" E 
20.00 feet; thence S 52#28'32" E 673.06 feet; thence S 11#27'09" 
E 82.42 feet; thence East 209.11 feet; thence South 686.56 feet; 
thence S 89*26'09" W 69.89 feet; thence N 11°27'09" W 305.86 feet; 
thence N Sl'lOMS" W 664.63 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel #2 
Beginning at a point which is South 1457.44 feet and East 
1381.49 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S 
82'28'18" E 297.19 feet; thence S 35#46'49" E 390.19 feet; thence 
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ll#27'09/,f E 55.58 feet; thence N 52-28'32" W 673.06 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Parcel #3 
Beginning at a point which is South 1812.93 feet and East 
1904.26 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N 
35#46'49" W 390.19 feet; thence S 82#28'18" E 230.12 feet; thence 
South 286.40 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel #4 
Beginning at a point which is South 1457.44 feet and East 
948,28 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N 
SS'OO'OO'* E 248.48 feet; thence S 55*00'00" E 354.87 feet; thence 
N 89*59'28* W 20.00 feet; thence West 413.21 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
parcel f? 
Beginning at a point which is South 1095.69 feet and East 
1309.00 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S 
49*07/07" E 450.31 feet; thence S 6503O'OO" E 280.00 feet; thence 
N 41#01'45" E 360.30 feet; thence South 713.45 feet; thence West 
209.11 feet; thence N 11#27'09" W 138.00 feet; thence North 286.40 
feet; thence N 82#28'18" W 527.31 feet; thence N 55#00'00" W 
314.87 feet; thence along the arc of a 700.00 foot radius curve 
to the right 260.74 feet, the chord of which bears N 45°40'15" 
E 259.24 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel #6 
Beginning at a point which is South 1095.69 feet and East 
13 09.00 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence along 
the arc of a 500.00 foot radius curve to the left 219.09 feetf 
the chord of which nears N 43°47'21* E 217.34 feet; thence S 
58#45'49" E 133.73 feet; thence N SS^OO'OO" E 220.00 feet; thence 
East 564.44 feet; thence S 3#19'16" W 407.49 feet; thence West 
100.00 feet; thence S 41#01'45" W 360.30 feet; thence N 65o30'00" 
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W 280.00 feet; thence N 49#07'07" W 450.31 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Parcel #7 
Beginning at a point which is South 2664.46 feet and East 
35.24 feet from the North Quarter corner of Section 5, Township 
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S 
SS'IS'OS'9 W 530.26 feet; thence North 320.74 feet; thence S 
66#59'43* E 575.11 feet; thence S 00#45'28" E 90.00 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Parcel #8 
Beginning at a point which is South 1234.73 feet and East 
2240.76 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N 
73#04'51'r E 428.70 feet; thence S 00M5'28" E 1429.67 feet; thence 
N 66#54'43" W 575.11 feet; thence North 562.81 feet; thence East 
425.00 feet; thence North 125.00 feet; thence West 425.00 feet; 
thence North 197.50 feet; thence East 425.00 feet; thence North 
125.00 feet; thence West 425.00 feet; thence North 68.95 feet; 
thence East 100.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel #9 
Beginning at a point which is South 1234.73 feet and East 
2240.76 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N 
3#19'16" E 407.49 feet; thence East 75.56 feet; thence N 58°17'49" 
E 358.21 feet; thence S 00#45'28" E 470.33 feet; thence S 
73#04/51" W 428.70 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel "D" 
Commencing at a point located South 2233.72 feet and East 
1353.37 feet from the Northwest Corner of Section 5, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
81#10'45" East 664.64 feet; thence South 11#27'09" East 300.00 
feet; thence South 89*10'45* West along a fence line 596.98 feet; 
thence South 87*52'55* West along a fence line 93.49 feet; thence 
North 58'17' West along a fence line 15.65 feet; thence South 
88•45'30" West along a fence line 12.69 feet; thence north 400.00 
feet to the point of beginning. 
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Parcel "F" 
Commencing at a point located South 1457.43 feet and East 
955.78 feet from the Northwest Corner of Section 5, Township 7 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East 
405.70 feet; thence South 20#36'47" West 197.28 feet; thence 
South 78•34'15" West 300.90 feet; thence North 09'36' West along 
the Easterly bank of the Upper East Union Canal 247.74 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
Paramount Lit? Parcel 
Beginning at a point which is North 114.11 feet and East 
388.71 feet from the East Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township 
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence along 
the arc of an 893.64 foot radius curve to the right 449.70 feet, 
the chord of which bears North 20•35'02" East 444.97 feet; thence 
North 35*00'00" East 556.99 feet; thence South 43*30'00" East 
436.93 feet; thence South 670.00 feet; thence East 154.39 feet; 
thence North 24.92 feet, thence North 88*45'30" East 12.69 feet; 
thence South 58•17'00" East 15.65 feet; thence North 89•16'50* 
East 672.01 feet; thence South 10*02'24" East 402.68 feet; thence 
South 21*26'15" East 442.45 feet; thence South 10#29'00" West 
603.46 feet; thence North 89#17'00" West 575.53 feet; thence North 
4#26'00" West 130.08 feet; thence North 6'12'30" West 242.43 feet; 
thence North 8•43'30* East 232.11 feet; thence North 33*34'00" 
East 50.89 feet; thence North 89•30'30" West 505.62 feet; thence 
South 0#08'00" East 43.42 feet; thence North 89°31'36" West 546.46 
feet; thence North 42*55'46" West 75.43 feet; thence along the 
arc of a 15 foot radius curve to the right 23.56 feet, the chord 
of which bears North 2*04'20" East 21.21 feet; thence North 
47#04'14" East 10.00 feet; thence North 42#55'46" West 80.00 
feet; thence along the arc of a 15 foot radius curve to the right 
23.56 feet, the chord of which bears North 87°55'40" West 21.21 
feet; thence North 42*55'46" West 32.00 feet; thence along the 
arc of a 222.73 foot radius curve to the right 190.86 feet, the 
chord of which bears North 18•22'52" West 185.07 feet; thence 
North 6*10'03" East 518.03 feet to the point of beginning. 
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LEASED LANDS 
U.S. Forest Service: 
The Heritige Mountain resort area within Sections 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, T. 6 S., R. 3 E. and Sections 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, T. 7 S., R. 3 E., Salt Lake Base and Meridian as delin-
eated on the permit area map. 
The Heritage Mountain resort area with Sections 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, T. 6 S., R. 3 E. and Sections 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, T. 7 S., R. 3 E., which is attached and made a part of 
the permit. 
City of Provo, Utah: 
TRACT 1: 
Beginning at a point on a fence line on the South line of 
300 North Street in Provo, Utah, East 80.62 feet and South 738.84 
feet from the West quarter corner of Section 5, Township 7 South, 
Range 3 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running 
thence South 89#31'36" East along a fence line on said South 
line of 300 North Street, 998.04 feet; thence North 0*08' West 
along a fence line projected 43.42 feet to the North line of 
300 North Street projected; thence South 89•30/30" East along 
the North line of 300 North Street projected 505.62 feet to the 
West bank of the Upper East Union Canal; thence southerly along 
the westerly bank of said canal on the following courses and 
distances: South 33*34' West 50.89 feet; thence South 8-43'30" 
West 232.11 feet; thence South 6*12'30" East 242.33 feet; thence 
South 4*26' East 130.08 feet to the North line of 150 North Street 
projected; thence leaving the said bank of said canal and running 
North 89*17' West along the line of the Street projected 144.05 
feet; thence North 1*27'30* East 97.88 feet; thence North 
89#15'39" West 231.01 feet; thence South 81#51'06" West 372.80 
feet; thence South 0*49'12" West 40.51 feet; thence North 89#17' 
West 739.91 feet; thence South 0o32'20" West 61.87 feet; thence 
North 89"22'20" West 621.21 feet; thence North 0*20'20" East along 
a fence line 654.96 feet; thence South 89*22'20" East along a 
fence line of the South line of 300 North Street a distance of 
623.50 feet, to the point of beginning. 
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TRACT NO, 2: 
Beginning at a point which is South 1872.32 feet and East 
69.75 feet from the East quarter corner of Section 6, Township 
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running 
thence North 88•15'46" West 922.76 feet; thence along the arc 
of a 297.89 foot radius curve to the right 295.20 feet, the chord 
of which bears North 31*27'37* East 283.27 feet; thence North 
59#51' East 425.03 feet; thence South 89"22'20'r East 411.47 feet; 
thence South 0*32'20* West 478.59 feet to the point of beginning. 
5. Defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Association's 
right, title, claim, lien and interest in and to the Property 
is hereby adjudged to be prior and superior both in time and as 
of right of the title, claims, liens and interests of all named 
parties, and each and all of them, and of all other persons or 
entities claiming any right to the title, claim, lien or interest 
in and to the Property and the whole thereof. 
6. That the rights, title, claims, liens and interest 
of all named parties in and to the Property are hereby adjudged 
to be subsequent, junior, subordinate and inferior to the lien 
and claim of defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Association in 
and to the Property. 
7. That the a^sMSfcC*^ 
^•BWMT'^tt^^ *com-, 
8. That the smti^Mimvwta£^mtA engineering worX;*pmr~i 
8 -
*Tur!M&"^tt^Tmspmcte^txfr thm-Property constitutes a lien on the 
property-as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3; 
9. This Court expressly finds that there is no just 
reason for delaying the entry of a Final Judgment on the issue 
of the priority of interests among the various parties in this 
action in and to the Property. Accordingly, this Court hereby 
expressly directs the entry of this Final Judgment against all 
parties on the issue of Guaranty Savings and Loan Association's 
prior interest in and to the Property and an appeal herefrom 
may be taken pursuant to Rule 54 (b) , Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure . 
10. The defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-
ation is awarded its costs of court herein expended. 
DATED this / jT day of November, 1986. 
BY Tip; COURT: 
GEORGE 1^/BALLIF 
Dis tr i c t Court Judge 
> U l t O f UIAM 1 S3 
"*->JNVf OP UTAH ! 
'HE UNDERSIGNED CL£RK O* THE DISTRICT COU» 
' . ' A * COt'NTY. UTAH. DO HE»F8V 'IcTHFY THAT THt 
••'•C ANi) r-OREGO!NG !S A TRUE AMP c j L l COPY Of 
- -. N A L COCUMtNT ON PILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH 
TNESS MY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID COURT THIS 
^
S \ . . DAY OF A / *~"^' n - ts ' »• * '-
»tUJAM F. ,HUtSH, CLERK 
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38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or fur-
nishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alter-
ation, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans 
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, esti-
mates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like 
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property 
upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service ren-
dered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by tv.ch 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the p r o p e m . 
38-1-4. Amount of land affected — Lots and subdivisions 
— Franchises, fixtures, and appurtenances. 
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to and cover so much of the 
land whereon such building, structure, or improvement shall be made as may 
be necessary for convenient use and occupation of the land. In case any such 
building shall occupy two or more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots 
or subdivisions shall be considered as one for the purposes of this chapter The 
hens provided for in this chapter shall attach to all franchises, privileges, 
appurtenances, and to all machinery and fixtures, pertaining to or used m 
connection with any such lands, buildings, structures, or improvements 
38-1-5. Priority—Over other encumbrances.—The liens herein provided 
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the commence-
ment to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or im-
provement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other en-
cumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first 
material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance of which the her holder had no notice and which was un-
recorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was com-
menced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground. 
38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing regardless 
of time of filing.—The liens for work and labor done or material furnished 
as provided in this chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regardless of 
date of filing the notice and claim of lien and regardless of the time of 
performing such work and labor or furnishing such material-
History: Code Report; R. S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 52-1-10. 
ft 
WD l/toh &u 
TITLE 52 
LIENS 
Chapter 1. MECHANICS' LIENS. 
Chapter 2. MISCELLANEOUS LIENS. 
Chapter 3. LESSORS' LIENS. 
Chapter 4. COMMON CARRIERS' LIENS. 
Chapter 5. JUDGMENT LIEN—U. S. COURTS. 
Chapter 6. FEDERAL TAX LIENS. 
CHAPTER I 
MECHANICS' LIENS* 
52-1-1 , Public Buildings Not Subject 52-1-12. 
to. 
52-1-2. Cont rac tors and Subcontrac- 52-1-1:5. 
tors Defined. 
52-1- : : . Who Ent i t l ed—Attaches to 52-1-14. 
Owner 's In teres t—Lien on 
Ores Mined. 52-1-15 . 
"2 1-4. Amount of Land Affected— 
Lots and Subdivisions— 52-1-1(5. 
Mines — Franch i ses , F ix- 52-1-17. 
tu res and Appur tenances . 52 -1 - IS . 
."2-1-5. Pr ior i ty—Over Other En- 52-1-11). 
cumbrances . 
52-1-G. Id. Over Claims of Credi tors 
of Original Cont rac tor or 52-1-20. 
Subcontractor . 
52-1-7. Notice of Cla im—Contents— 52-1 -21 . 
Recording. 
"2-1 8. Id. Including Liens on Sev-
eral P roper t i e s in One 52-1-22. 
, Claim. 52-1-2:!. 
52 1-1). Id. Notice Impar ted by Rec-
ord. 
52 1-10. Labore r s ' and Mater ia lmen ' s 52-1-24. 
Lien on Equal Foot ing Re-
gardless of Time of Fi l ing. 52-1-25 . 
52-1-11. Enforcement—Time for—Lis 52-l-2f>. 
Pendens—Action for Debt 
Not Affected. 
Origin and history of act . The Mechanic's Lien Law of this s t a t e was taken 
from Colorado, together with the construction placed thereon by the Colorado courts . 
Validity. The Utah Mechanic's Lien Law is not made in pursuance of any express 
requirement of the Const i tut ion; but the law may, nevertheless, be consti tut ional 
;<r;'i!S( tin- < \»Mstitu1 ion d. x-s not prohibit it. Uio ( irandc Lumber Co. v. Darke, 
•"" I . 111. 121. 107 IMMl , L. R. A. RHSA 11!>:;. 
f'ur|i«;>e a ad object of law. The aim and purpose of our Mechanic's Lien Law 
manifefMy lias been to protect , a t all hazards , those who perform the labor and 
furnish the mater ia ls which enter into the construction of a huildimr or other-
improvement. The owner of the premises is most likely to suffer. Rio Grande 
Lumber Co. v. Darke. 50 U . ' I M , 122, 107 I \ 241. L. R. A. 11)18 A 11SKJ. 
[53.1] 
Id. Notice to Other Claim-
an ts—Waiver . 
Id. Pa r t i e s—Jo inde r—In te r -
vention. 
Id. Decree—Order of Sat is-
faction. 
Id. Sale—Redemption —-Dis-
position of Proceeds. 
Id. Deficiency Judgmen t . 
Id. Costs. 
Id. At to rneys ' Fees. 
Payment by Owner to Con-
t rac to r — Subcontrac tor ' s 
Lien Not Affected. 
U\. When Contrac t Price Not 
Payable in Cash—Notice. 
Id. Advance Payments—Ef-
fect on Subcont rac tor ' s 
Lien. 
Id. 
Creditors Cannot Reach Ma-
ter ia ls Furn ished , Except 
for Purchase Pr ice . 
Cancellation of Record—Pen-
alty. 
Abuse of Lien Righ t—Pena l ty . 
Assignment of Lien. 
52-1-1 Title 52—Liens [532] 
Nature and perfection of lien. Mechanic's lien is purely statutory, not contractual, 
and none can be acquired unless claiman has complied with provisions of statut* 
creating lien. Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 U. 241, 87 P. 713. 
General construction. This whole act must be cons-trued together and, if possible 
effect be jriven to every part of it. The real intention of the legislature in enacting 
this law cannot be ascertained by a consideration of the several sections separately. 
Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co.. i> U. 70, 7!», 33 P. 238; Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin' 
31 U. 241, 87 P. 713. ' "* 
52-1-1. Public Buildings Not Subject to. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any public building, 
structure or improvement. (C. L. 17, § 3751.) 
History. 
This section is identical with last sen-
tence of R. S. 1898, § 1399; Comp. Laws 
1907, § 1399. 
Cross-references. 
Contractors' bonds on public contracts, 
17-1. 
1. Operation and effect of section. 
Although a workman or materialman 
cannot acquire a lien on a public build-
ing for labor or material furnished fh 
the construction of such building, he may 
have a prior or preferential right to 
moneys in the hands of the public cor-
poration to be used in the construction 
of the building under 17-1-2. Mountain 
States Supplv Co. v. Nuttall-Allen Co., 
03 U. 3S4, 225 P. 811. 
2. School buildings. 
Although Session Laws of 1890, p. 24, 
apparently contained no provision in 
History. 
This was section 3815 of 2 Comp. Laws 
1888, Ch. 1. The present section is 
identical with R. S. 1898, § 1383; Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 1383. 
Comparable provisions. 
Iowa Code 1939. § 10270, subd. 2 ("sub-
contractor" includes every person fur-
nishing material or performing labor, 
except those having contracts directly 
with owner, his agent or trustee). 
1. Applicability of section. 
A contract of pledge is sufficient. 
Kvans v. Jenx-n. 51 V. 1. H»S P. 7»>*J. 
Decisions from other jurisdictions. 
— Iowa. 
It is only under contract with the 
owner that a party can be allowed a 
that regard, it was nevertheless held 
that mechanic's lien would not attach to 
house and land devoted to public use, 
such as a schoolhouse. Board of Educa-
tion of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
Pressed Brick Co., 13 U. 211, 222, 44 P. 
709, 20 A. L. R. 32G, 335. 
3. Bond as substitute for lien. 
Notwithstanding materialmen and la-
borers are without right to file lien 
against public building, and there is no 
statute expressly requiring trustees of 
state college to take bond from con-
tractor to secure payment of material 
and labor furnished contractors, if bond 
is given to secure such payments, per-
sons who perform labor or furnish ma-
terial may enforce security. Smith v. 
Bowman. *32 U. 33, 88 P. 087, 9 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 889. 
lien as an original contractor. Templin 
v. Chicago, B. & P. Ry. Co., 73 Iowa 
548, 35 N. W. 034. 
Code 1924. § 10270 (Code 1939, 
§ 10270) was not intended to be con-
strued as a limitation of the word 
"owner" as used in section 10271, relat-
ing to mechanics' liens. Schoeneman 
Lumber Co. v. Davis, 200 Iowa 873, 205 
N. W. 502. 
Purchaser of real estate under instal-
ment contract is "owner" within meaninjf 
of Mechanic's Lion Law. Knapp v. Bald-
win, 213 Iowa 24, 238 N. \V. 542. 
Ordinarily to "furnish'' means to de-
liver or t<> supply, and in Mechanic's 
Lien Law to deliver or supply for use in 
making of improvement or erection of 
building. A. E. Shorthill Co. v. Aetna 
Indemnity Co. of Hartford, Conn. 
(Iowa), 124 X. W. 013. 
52-1-2. Contractors and Subcontractors Defined. 
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by contract, express or 
implied, with the owner, as in this chapter provided, shall be deemed an 
original contractor, and all other persons doing work or furnishing ma-
terials shall be deemed subcontractors. (C. L. 17, § 3733.) 
WSJ Title 52—Liens 52-1-3 
A. L. K. notes. 
Who is a "con t r ac to r " within provi-
sions of Lien Law which limit liens for 
material or labor furnished to cont rac tor 
to amount earned hut unpaid on contract , 
or give such liens bv subrogat ion, 83 A. 
L. R. 1152. 
;,2-l-3. Who Entitled—Attaches to Owner's Interest—Lien on Ores 
Mined. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing labor upon, 
or furnishing materials to be used in, the construction or alteration of, 
or addition to, or repair of, any building, structure or improvement 
upon land; all foundry men and boiler makers; all persons performing 
labor or furnishing materials for the construction, repairing or carry-
ing on of any mill, manufactory or hoisting works; all persons who shall 
do work or furnish materials for the prospecting, development, preser-
vation or working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or 
deposit; and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have 
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, esti-
mates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other 
like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, per-
formed labor or furnished materials, for the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each respectively, 
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by 
his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall attach 
only to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but the 
interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether working 
under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include 
products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the prem-
ises included within the lease. 
(C. L. 17, §§ 286, 3722, 3731, 3732, 3747.) 
History. 
This section was originally taken from 
Colorado, and in many respects resembles 
the enac tment of t h a t s t a te . See 3 
Colorado S ta t s . Ann., Ch. 101, 5 1 5 . 
The present section is, in many r e -
spects, identical with R. S. 1898. § 1372. 
:»»d with Comp. Laws 1907, § 1372. I t 
was formerly section 380G of 2 Comp. 
Laws 1888, Ch. 1. 
Formerly the liens of the principal con-
ti'actor and the subcontrac tor were 
•
s< para te ly provided for. Morrison v. 
Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70, 33 P. 238. 
Comparable provisions. 
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, § 1183 (lien 
ronforred for performing' labor upon or 
bestowing skill or other necessary serv-
'«'<•*, or furnishing mater ia l s or appl i-
ances contr ibut ing to construction, al-
!
* lotion, addition to or repair of building, 
improvement of land, and other desig-
? ,aUd objects and project?) . 
Idaho Code, $ 44-501 (every person 
P ' i fo rming labor on. or furnishing ma-
' • ' i n l s for construction, a l tera t ion or 
' i p a i r of mining claim, building, s t ruc-
tu re and other designated objects and 
projects has lien the reon) . 
Iowa Code 193!), § 10271 (every person 
who furnishes mater ia l or per forms la-
bor on building, construction, repai r , or 
improvement has lien on building and 
l and) . 
Mont. Rev. Codes, § 8339 (lien con-
ferred for work or labor done, or ma-
ter ia l , machinery or fixtures furnished, 
in connection with any building, s t ruc-
tu re , improvement and o ther designated 
objects and pro jec ts ) . 
Cross-references. 
Bond to protect mechanics and ma-
ter ia lmen under pr iva te cont rac ts , 17-2. 
1. Words and phrases defined. 
2. — " o w n e r . " 
One in possession of land under a con-
tract of purchase is an "owner" within 
meaning of this section. Carv-Lombard 
Lumber Co. v. Pa r t r idge , 10 U. 322, 37 
1\ 572. 
One having an equitable in teres t in the 
premises is an owner within the meaning 
of this section, hut such lien mav also 
Title 52—Liens 52-1-4 
j • foi material *pt.c.ally fabricated 
fi.r and adapted :•• building, but 
r.,t used therein. ' ; A. L. R. 320. 
I • f».r -services of p ri»»n supervising 
, <>n»truction of building, architect, 
, t .. no A. L. Pw. 1257. 
\j •, • ..1 or labor emrl- ytd in construc-
i iii of concrete f-.-nns as basis of 
. n or claim ur. k r contractors' 
d. 84 A. L. R. 4^0. 
V .: icV or materialman's lien on 
}., mestcad, 65 A. L. R. 1192. 
twr i '•* right to deduction on account 
. f damages sustained through con-
tac tor ' s delay, 37 A. L. R. 7GG. 
u • . i'- right to reccwr from con-
factor or surety on his bond 
.miount paid or agreed to be paid 
».y former to third person, in order 
f.» avoid mechanics' liens for labor 
. • material furni-hvd to contractor, 
1 I A. L. R. 314. |\.v i «d* court to authorize or direct 
hn iv iT (or trustet in bankruptcy) 
!•• -ell property free from liens, 35 
\ L. R. 255, 78 A. L. R. 458. 
I'» . voting indebtedness of contractor 
to <»\vner as affecting right of sub-
c «-!iti actor, materialman, or laborer 
i.. hen, G8 A. L. R. 1202. 
T \ . to pay lien a« embracing prom-
i- to pay debt, 10 A. L. R. 81)1. 
r . v Miib of statutes to secure pay-
it : t for work or L.bor as includ-
:! j u^e of labor*, i '* own team. 
. :»'mobile, or ot lur equipment, 71 
\. I,. R. 1130. 
I. > of contractor's lien as affect-
M'ur subcontractor's li^-n. G9 A. L. 
\l. 1205. 
Removal or demolition of building or 
other structure as basis for me-
chanic's lien, 03 A. L. R. 1250. 
Requirement of written contract as con-
dition of mechanic's lien as affected 
by an oral modification, or a modi-
fication partly oral and partly 
written, of a written contract, or 
a subsequent modification in writ-
ing not registered or filed as re-
quired by statute, 108 A. L. R. 434. 
Right of one other than contractor, 
laborer, or materialman to file lien, 
83 A. L. R. 11. 
Right of one who pays or advances 
money, or assumes obligation to 
pay laborer or materialman, to lien 
or priority, 74 A. L. R. 522. 
Right of subcontractor or materialman 
to mechanic's lien for labor or ma-
terial entering into work rejected 
as not in compliance with prin-
cipal contract, 1G A. L. R. 981. 
Right to benefit of mechanic's lien stat-
ute for labor or material furnished 
to contractor or subcontractor, as 
affected by acceptance from him 
of written obligation, 66 A. L. R. 
342. 
Right to lien against fee for work or 
material furnished under contract 
with life tenant, 97 A. L. R. 870. 
Termination of lease as affecting lien 
on buildings erected by tenant 
where lien did not attach to land-
lord's title, 87 A. L. R. 1290. 
Validity and effect of provision in con-
tract against mechanic's lien, 102 
A. L. R. 35G. 
."•2-1-1. Amount of Land Affected—Lots and Subdivisions—Mines— 
Franchises. Fixtures and Appurtenances. 
Tht» liens granted by this chapter shall extend to and cover so much 
•d lin» land whereon such building, structure or improvement shall be 
"k<i«' as may be necessary for the convenient use and occupation 
tliuvni", and in case any such building shall occupy two or more lots 
'»»• <>tluT subdivisions of land, such lots or subdivisions shall be deemed 
0,|<' for the purposes of this chapter; and when two or more mining 
* li.im .^ mines or valuable deposits, whether owned by the same person 
°i' not. shall, with the consent of all, be worked through a common shaft, 
t:iniud. incline, drift or other excavation, then all the mining claims, 
inline or valuable deposits so worked shall for the purposes of this 
•'.'ipter be deemed or,v_: and the liens in this chapter provided for shall 
••'••i»-h to all franchise-, privileges, appurtenances, and to all machinery 
• ' ' ' iKturcs, pertaini:*.£.r to or used in connection with any such lands, 
'•'•l.iji!^, structures or improvements, mining claims, mines or valuable 
!
 i»-iK (C. L. 17, §§ 3727, 3729, 3731.) 
HMon. 
' ' ^ i Hon to a cor.s. it-raule extent originally derived from Colorado, and 
'•'mtu-al with R. S. 1S98, §1379; hears a marked similarity thereto. Sec 
*'•»». Laws 1907, § 1379. It was 3 Colorado Stats. Ann., Ch. 101, £ 17. 
IV,. J Title 52—Liens 52-1-5 
:>2-i—">• Priority—Over Other Encumbrances. 
'The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as 
,,!', the time of the commencement to do worker furnish materials on 
tin- ground tor the structure or improvement/and shall have priority 
OUT Any lfen, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have at-
Kirhcd subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or 
.tincture was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on 
tin- ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of 
which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the 
time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, work 
hrirun, or first material furnished on the ground. 
(C. L. 17, §§3734, 3735.) 
History. 
This section was derived from the 
i i ratio Statutes, and is in many re-
•...:> similar thereto. See 3 Colorado 
.*:.-.! . Ann., Ch. 101, §20. 
I ip\ section is, in most respects, simi-
lar to \l. S. 1808, §1385; Comp. Laws 
I'M-;, § 1385. It was section 3810 of 2 
»'..-i;|). Laws 1888, Ch. 1, and was section 
I ,.f Session Laws of 1890, Ch. 30, p. 29. 
>-.-.• Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U. 
..'. T'.t. 33 P. 238. 
torn parable provisions. 
« .!. Civil Proc. Code, § 118G, Idaho 
« •?••. c 1-1—50<> (substantially the same, 
• •'•:•> ihat the "relate back" clause is 
: « • « ! » . 
1
 • C >de 1'.'39, $10287 (mechanics' 
. . are preferred to all other liens ex-
••«!•. -'.ch as contractor or subcontractor 
i i actual or constructive notice of be-
' .» commencement of work or l'urnish-
•••••- ol' material) . 
M »;;. Rev. Codes, §8344 (liens attach 
•' i'reference to any prior lien, encum-
:u e or mortgage) . 
1
 Operation and effect of section. 
J In- section places all mechanics' liens 
• at- <lass not only without priority 
•''•"•.u themselves, but also that rights 
•
 !
 .il of* the liens of same class attach 
". ihe date when the first lien of such 
• ••» attached. United States Building 
A
 Lo:i:: Ass'n v. Midvale Home Finance 
1
 "'!>.. 86 U. 506, 44 P.2d 1090, rehearing 
•
|4!V«-d 86 U. 522, 46 P.2d 672. 
1
 his section requires other lienholders, 
•mortgage or otherwise, to take notice 
Hie commencement of work on the 
; ! :
-n«.v. Teahen v. Nelson, 6 U. 363, 23 
'' ' , « • . ! . 
1
 »£«muncement and duration of lien. 
!
 ' -••£tjon expressly provides that all 
'•• !".is^shall attach at the time the 
'ii!:.!i;'0 of the contract commences; 
' '!i;v.!-lv. claimant's lien attaches o.n 
'j'«/tato he commences to do the work or 
- i j jmi i sh the material, and is not post-
poned to the date of filing- thp nntirP fqr 
record as provided in 52-1-7. Morrison 
v. Carev-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70, 33 P. 
238. 
Mechanic's lien takes effect as of date 
of commencement of work and furnishing 
of materials, and is prior to intervening 
equities. Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 U. 379, 
85 P. 363. 
When labor and materials are fur-
nished to one not an owner, lien attaches 
to title instant title vests in owner so 
contracting for labor and materials fur-
nished before he became the owner. 
United States Building & Loan Ass'n v. 
Midvale Home Finance Corp., 86 U. 506, 
44 P.2d 1090, rehearing denied 86 U. 522, 
46 P.2d 672. 
Under former statute, held that lien 
of subcontractor attached on date of sub-
contractor's commencing to do work or 
to furnish materials. Morrison v. Inter-
Mountain Salt Co., 14 U. 201, 46 P. 1104, 
following Morrison v. Carev-Lombard 
Co., 9 U. 70, 33 P. 238. 
3. Priorities. 
1. —over other liens and claims. 
Lien for all of materials, furnished by 
single lien claimant, en continuous, open, 
running account, for purpose of develop-
ing and operating mine, held prior to 
trust deed executed by mining company, 
and recorded, between times when mate-
rials were first and last furnished. 
Fields v. Daisv Gold Min. Co., 25 U. 76, 
69 P. 528 (Baskin, J., dissenting); Salt 
Lake Hardware Co. v. Fields, 69 P. 1134, 
not officially reported (Baskin, J., dis-
senting) . 
A deed of trust upon a canal to be COH-
stnictrrf cannot take precedence over a 
mechanic's l«en for work done and mate-
rials furnished in building the canal, 
even though trust deed antedates the 
doing of the work or furnishing the 
materials. Canal was not in existence 
until constructed. Garland v. Dear Lake 
<fc River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 9 
U. 350, 362, 34 P. 368, aff'd 164 U. S. 1, 
41 L. Ed. 327, 17 S. Ct. 7. 
